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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and
pursuant to a request of the Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals, Mary
T. Noonan, the Plaintiff, John Wagner Associates dba Grabber Utah,
respectfully submits this Response to Defendant Hercules' Petition for
Rehearing.

In accordance with the instructions from the Clerk of the

Utah Court of Appeals, the Plaintiff is responding only to Sections
II. B. and II.D. of Hercules' Petition.

The Clerk specifically

instructed the Plaintiff not to address the arguments made by the
Defendant in Sections II.A. and II.C. of Defendant's Petition for
Rehearing.
ARGUMENT
The standard for reviewing Hercules' Petition for Rehearing is
stated in Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Rule
states, in pertinent part, "The petition shall state with particularity the points of law or fact which the petitioner claims the court
has overlooked or misapprehended . . . ." Section II.B. of Hercules'
Petition, fails to set forth any law or facts which the Court overlooked or misapprehended.

And, while Section II.D. of Hercules'

Petition does state a valid point of law that the Court misapprehended, there is additional law upon which the Court may grant an award of
attorneys' fees to the Plaintiff for Hercules' failure to obtain a
payment bond, as set forth more fully below.
Although Section II.B. of Hercules' Petition fails to meet the
standard for the Court's review, each of the two Sections of Hercules'
Petition for which a response has been requested by the Court is
addressed in the subsections below.

1

I.

THE COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE PURCHASE ORDER BETWEEN HERCULES
AND MODULAIRE CONSTITUTED A CONTRACT FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
MODULAR OFFICE UNITS.
In Section II.B. of the Petition, Hercules assails the Court's

decision that, as a matter of law, the purchase order between Hercules
and Modulaire for the procurement of the office buildings constituted
a contract for the construction of those buildings. Hercules' attack
on the Court's holding is twofold, neither of which warrants a
rehearing or a change in the Court's Opinion of August 31, 1990.
First, Hercules claims that the Court was in error since the
Plaintiff did not contract directly with Hercules.

And second,

Hercules criticizes the Court's reliance upon a factual stipulation
concerning

the

contractual

relationships

on

the project, which

stipulation was entered voluntarily by Hercules at the trial of the
case.

The contentions asserted by Hercules with respect to the this

issue are completely groundless.

The Court has not overlooked or

misapprehended any facts or law with respect to the Court's holding
that the purchase order constituted a contract for the construction of
the office buildings.

Nevertheless, the Plaintiff addresses the two

contentions of Hercules below.
With respect to the first contention, Hercules attempts to
mislead the Court by fabricating a statutory requirement that the
Plaintiff must have contracted directly with Hercules in order for
Utah Code Annotated §§ 14-2-1 et seq. to apply.

On page 6 of the

Petition, Hercules erroneously states that "Hercules, therefore, did
not contract with Wagner for the construction of the units, as
required by the Payment Bond Statute."
Plaintiff

did

not

contract

with

While it is true that the

Hercules,

requirement exists in the Payment Bond Statute.
2

no

such

statutory

Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 (1953 as amended in 1985) states
that:
The owner of any interest in land entering into a contract , involving $2,000 or more, for the construction,
addition to, alteration, or repair of any building,
structure or improvement upon land shall, before any
such work is commenced, obtain from the contractor a
bond in the sum equal to the contract price, with good
and sufficient sureties, conditioned upon the faithful
performance of the contract and the prompt payment for
material furnished, equipment and materials rented, and
labor performed under the contract.
Emphasis added.

Section 14-2-2 (1953 as amended in 1965) goes on to

state, in pertinent part, that:
Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter,
who shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond,
or to exhibit the same, as required herein, shall be
personally liable to all persons who have furnished
materials or performed labor under the contract. . . .
Emphasis added.
From a reading of these Sections, it is clear that contract
privity is not required for a person to make a claim under Utah Code
Annotated §§ 14-2-1 et seq., either on a bond, if one is provided, or
against the owner personally, if a bond is not provided.

In fact,

these statutes, and the personal liability of the property owner
mandated therein, were created specifically to eliminate lack of
privity defenses when an owner receives the benefit of labor or
materials provided to improve the owner's property but fails to
require a bond to assure payment thereof.
The Defendant also assails the Court's reliance upon the stipulation of the contractual chain for the procurement of the modular
office complexes.

However, Hercules fails to point out in its

Petition that the Court did not rely solely on the stipulation to
arrive at the legal conclusion that the purchase order constituted a
3

contract for the construction of the office buildings.

The Court

arrived at the same conclusion by analyzing the facts of the case and
the provisions of the purchase order itself.

The stipulation,

combined with the facts of the case, present overwhelming proof that
the purchase order between Hercules and Modulaire constituted a
contract for the construction of the office buildings.
The stipulation, as well as the evidence submitted at the trial
and the representations of the Defendant's own attorney at the oral
argument before this Court, clearly establish the following:
1.

Hercules entered into a purchase order with Modulaire for
the procurement of approximately 25,000 square feet of
office space which was to be constructed using modular units
for the shell of two seperate buildings, the construction of
which extended to finishing, altering and improving the
shells to specifications required by Hercules for completed
office buildings.

2.

Under the purchase order, Modulaire owed a duty to Hercules
to provide the office buildings within a time certain and
according to specifications which were issued, approved
and/or required by Hercules.

3.

In order to meet its obligations under the purchase order,
Modulaire contracted with Space Building Systems for the
construction of the interior of the office buildings.

4.

In order for Space Building Systems to meet its obligations
under its construction contract with Modulaire, and
derivatively for Modulaire to meet its obligations to
Hercules under the purchase order, Space Building Systems
contracted with the Plaintiff to provide materials for the
construction of the interior of the office buildings.

5.

The materials supplied by the Plaintiff were in fact used in
the construction of the office buildings.

6.

Hercules did not require a payment bond from Modulaire to
assure the payment of the labor and materials required to
construct the office buildings as required by Utah Code
Annotated §§ 14-2-1 et seq. (1953 as amended in 1985).

For the Defendant to argue that the purchase order between
Modulaire and Hercules was not for the construction of the office
buildings not only disregards the plain language of the statute but it
4

ignores the facts that the Court has already thoroughly reviewed in
arriving at its decision.

Further, Hercules has failed to identify

even one fact or state one element of law which the Court has
overlooked or misapprehended.
Hercules' contentions simply defy common sense.

If the purchase

order was not one for construction of the office buildings, how was
Modulaire supposed to fulfill its contractual obligations to Hercules?
Were the office complexes supposed to materialize out of thin air
without

any effort to purchase, assemble

and erect the various

materials and components into finished buildings? It defies logic for
there to be any conclusion other than the purchase order was indeed a
contract for the construction of the office buildings.
In its opinion, this Court properly drew from the stipulation and
from the facts of the case to hold that, as a matter of law, the
purchase order was for the construction of the office buildings. The
fact that Hercules now wishes that it had not entered into the
stipulation should be of no consequence to the Court.

This is

especially true since there is ample evidence in the record that the
stipulation accurately reflects the contractual relationships among
the contracting entities.
The Court, in the text of Footnote 4 on pages 6 and 7 of the
August

31, 1990 Opinion, correctly states that even aside from

stipulation entered voluntarily by Hercules, the evidence in the
record leads to the conclusion that the purchase order constituted a
contract for the construction of the office buildings.

It is sound

reasoning which led the Court to state generally:
If a lessee enters into an agreement to lease a
building which is not currently on its land but will be
constructed by the lessor, the lessee is necessarily
5

entering into a contract to construct the building upon
its land or the land in which it has an interest.
Even more compelling are the facts of this case where the buildings
were constructed by a contractor which is not the lessor.
Hercules has an interest in the land which predates the purchase
order contract between Hercules and Modulaire for the procurement of
the office buildings.

Hercules entered into a purchase order for

procurement of the office buildings upon the land in which it has an
interest.

In order for Modulaire to fulfil its obligations to

Hercules under the purchase order, it had to construct the office
buildings.

Therefore, the purchase order is necessarily a contract

for the construction of the office buildings. No other conclusion is
possible under the facts of this case.
The facts of the case are largely undisputed and the Court cited
some of those facts to show several indicators that the purchase order
was a contract for the construction of the office buildings.

In

Footnote 4, pp. 6 and 7 of the August 31, 1990 Opinion, the Court
stated:
Even absent the parties' stipulation, the leasing
arrangement constitutes a contract for the construction
of a building on its own merits. The purchase order by
which Hercules leased the complexes from Modulaire
states: "These complexes will be built to Hercules
specification no. 9106." The purchase order also states
"Installation to be complete as soon as possible.
Hercules will be responsible for site preparation,
sewer, water and electrical service hookups."
The
purchase order also provided for one time charges for
"delivery, set-up and skirting" of the complexes which
were to be billed separately from the monthly lease
payments. The construction contract between Modulaire
and SBS similarly refers to Hercules as the "Owner" and
Modulaire as the "Contractor."
Emphasis in original.
While these are the facts that the Court cited, there are many

6

others in the record which further support the conclusion made by the
Court.
II.

WHILE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 14-2-3 (1953 AS ENACTED IN 1963) DOES
NOT PROVIDE FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES IN AN ACTION FOR FAILURE TO
OBTAIN A PAYMENT BOND, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 14-2-2(3) (1953 AS
AMENDED IN 1989) APPLIES TO PENDING LITIGATION AND ENTITLES THE
PLAINTIFF TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES IN THIS ACTION FOR
FAILURE TO OBTAIN A PAYMENT BOND.
Hercules correctly states the status of the law with respect to

Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-3 (1953 as enacted in 1963). However, that
does not mean that the Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of
attorneysf fees.
In 1986, the Utah legislature amended § 14-2-3 and then repealed
it in 1987.

Then in 1989, the Utah legislature amended Utah Code

Annotated § 14-2-2 to specifically include provisions for attorneys'
fees in claims for failure to obtain a payment bond.

Section 14-2-

2(3) (1953 as amended in 1989) states:
(3) In an action for failure to obtain a bond, the
court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party. These fees shall be taxed as costs
in the action.
There is persuasive authority which leads to the conclusion that
an award of attorneys' fees in this action is appropriate under § 142-2 (1953 as amended in 1989) even though the amendment was made
during the pendency of this case.
The starting point in the analysis is to set forth the general
rule.

Generally, the substantive law which is in effect at the time

a cause of action accrues is the law which should apply to any suit to
enforce the cause of action.

See, Carlucci v. Utah State Industrial

Commission, 725 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1986).

This general rule is well

founded in common law (See, Farrel v. Pingree, 5 Utah 443, 16 P. 843
(1888) (predecessor statute was merely a statement of well-settled
7

rules of statutory construction)) and in statutory law (See, Utah Code
Annotated § 68-3-3).

See also, In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982).

However, since the statute governing this general rule is merely
a statement of well-settled rules of statutory construction, it is
subject to the common law exceptions to such rule.
There are several exceptions to the general rule upon which Utah
and other courts have applied intervening statutory amendments to
pending litigation.

These are: (1) when the statutory amendment

affects only procedural law rather than substantive rights (State
Department of Social Services v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982) and
Pilcher v. State Department of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah
1983)); (2) when the amendment is remedial (Marshall v. Industrial
Commission, 704 P.2d 581 (Utah 1985)); (3) when the amendment is meant
to clarify and amplify existing law (State Department of Social
Services v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982) and Okland Construction
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 520 P.2d 208 (Utah 1974)); (4) when the
amendment does not enlarge, eliminate or destroy vested or contractual
rights (State Department of Social Services v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998
(Utah 1982) and Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 704 P.2d 581 (Utah
1985)); and (5) when the statutory amendment specifically states that
it is to apply retroactively (Utah Code Annotated § 68-3-3).
The exceptions to the general rule are as well-settled as the
general rule.

The Utah Supreme Court stated that "Even in states

where the state constitution prohibits retroactive application of
statutes, an exception is made for remedial procedural statutes."
Pilcher v. State, Department of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450, 455
(Utah 1983).

The Utah cases cited above have applied statutory

amendments retroactively, or have at least recognized that such
8

application is appropriate. This is so regardless of the general rule
stated in Utah Code Annotated § 68-3-3. There can be no question that
the common law exceptions to the general rule which are noted above
apply to Utah Code Annotated § 68-3-3.
The Utah Supreme Court stated:
A contrary rule applies, however, where a statute
changes only procedural law by providing a different
mode or form of procedure for enforcing substantive
rights. Such remedial statutes are generally applied
retrospectively to accrued or pending actions to
further the Legislature's remedial purpose.
Pilcher, 663 P.2d at 455.

The Utah Supreme Court also stated:

[P]rocedural statutes enacted subsequent to the
initiation of a suit which do not enlarge, eliminate,
or destroy vested or contractual rights apply not only
to future actions, but also to accrued and pending
actions as well.
State v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982).
This Court must determine whether the intervening amendment of
Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-2 to allow a discretionary award of
attorneys1 fees fits into one of the common law exceptions to the
general rule and, therefore, should be applied to this case to allow
the Plaintiff to recover attorneys' fees under Utah Code Annotated §
14-2-2 (1953 as amended in 1989).

The Court must determine whether

the intervening amendment of § 14-2-2 (1953 as amended in 1989) does
not "enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights" of
the parties hereto.

If it does not, Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-2

(1953 as amended in 1989) should be applied to this case and the
Plaintiff should be awarded its reasonable attorneys' fees as costs.
Such an award is in the discretion of the Court.
To the best of the Plaintiff's knowledge, the Utah appellate
courts, have never addressed the issue of whether an intervening
9

statutory amendment authorizing an award of attorneys' fees fits into
one of the stated exceptions.

The Plaintiff is also unaware of any

Utah trial court decisions regarding this issue.

However, there are

other states' appellate courts which have directly addressed the
issue.
The

Washington

Court

of Appeals

held

that

an

intervening

statutory amendment authorizing attorneys' fees was procedural or
remedial in nature.

That Court stated:

Statutes generally operate prospectively unless
remedial in nature. A statute is remedial when it
relates to practice, procedure or remedies and does not
affect substantive or vested rights.
We deem
attorney's fees to be remedial in nature and therefore
give the statute retroactive effect.
Camer v. Seattle School District No. 1, 52 Wash.App. 531, 762 P.2d 356
(1988) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

See also, Bradfute v.

Renton School District No. 403, 19 Wash.App. 638, 577 P.2d 157, 159
n.l (1978).
The Supreme Court of California also held that an intervening
statutory amendment authorizing attorneys' fees would apply to cases
pending on appeal. In Woodland Hills v. City Counsel of Los Angeles,
154 Cal.Rptr. 503, 593 P.2d 200, 206 (1979) stated:
The section provides explicit statutory authorization
for a "private attorney general" attorney fee award. .
. . Although section 1021.5 was not on the books at
the time the trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for
attorney fees, the governing authorities establish that
the new statute nonetheless applies to this proceeding,
which was pending on appeal at the time the legislative
enactment became effective.
Emphasis added.

The California Court went on to cite substantial

Federal case authority for the proposition that intervening statutory
amendments authorizing awards of attorneys' fees apply to cases
pending on appeal at the time of the effective date of the amendment.
10

See,, e.g., Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696 (1974); Gore
v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1977; Alphin v. Henson, 552 F.2d
1033 (4th Cir. 1977); and Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10 (2nd Cir.
1976).
Other state courts have held that where a statutory amendment
grants the court authority to award discretionary attorneys1 fees, as
opposed to a mandatory award of attorneys' fees, such amendments would
be applied to pending actions. Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-2 (1953 as
amended in 1989) grants such discretionary authority to the courts to
award attorneys' fees and tax them as costs in the action.
In Circle K Corporation v. Rosenthal, 118 Ariz. 63, 574 P.2d 856
(1978), the Arizona Court of Appeals held that a permissive statutory
amendment which became effective during the pendency of the appeal was
to be applied to the case on appeal.
The Idaho Supreme Court has also applied an intervening statutory
amendment allowing an award of attorneys' fees to a pending case. In
Jensen v. Shank, 99 Idaho 565, 585 P.2d 1276, 1277-1278 (1978), the
Court stated:
The application of I.e. § 12-121 to a claim for relief
which arose prior to the enactment of that section but
tried after the section became law is not an improper
retroactive application of that section since we view
its provision as remedial and procedure and not as
affecting the substantive claim for relief.
Eir hasis added.

See also, Ericksen v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 116 Idaho

693, 778 P.2d 815 (Idaho App. 1989) (attorneys' fees amendment applied
retroactively since either party could recover att' neys' fees if it
were the successful party).
Another Idaho case further emphasizes the point.

In Meyers v.

Vermaas, 114 Idaho 85, 753 P.2d 296, 298 (Idaho App. 1988), while the
11

Court declined to allow and award of attorneys' fees because it
required a mandatory award rather than a discretionary award, the
Court stated:
Statutes which do not "create, enlarge, diminish or
destroy contractual or vested rights" are deemed to be
remedial or procedural, as opposed to substantive. . .
When this classification scheme is applied to
statutes authorizing discretionary awards of attorney
fees, such statutes generally are held to be remedial
or procedural.
Consequently, they are given
retroactive effect. Presumably, any amendment to such
statutes would receive retrospective effect.
Emphasis in original.

Citations omitted.

These cases are helpful and persuasive in deciding the case at
bar.

Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-2 (1953 as amended in 1989) states

that "the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing
party."

This grant of discretionary authority does not enlarge,

create or diminish vested or contractual rights of the parties.

The

ability of the prevailing party to recover reasonable attorneys' fees
does not affect the substantive rights of the parties.

The cause of

action upon which the Plaintiff seeks recovery remains the same and
Hercules is still liable for failure to obtain a payment bond.
Section 14-2-2 (1953 as amended in 1989) further states that
"These fees shall be taxed as costs in the action."

Thus, the award

of attorneys' fees under this Section is not substantive right of the
parties but rather an extension of the Court's undisputed authority to
procedurally award "costs" in an action or appeal.
From the discussion above, it is clear that the amendment of Utah
Code Annotated § 14-2-2 (1953 as amended in 1989) to allow the
discretionary award of attorneys' fees is a procedural provision which
is remedial in nature and should be applied to this case to grant the
12

Plaintiff an award of its reasonable attorneys' fees herein.1
CONCLUSION
It is clear that the Court did not overlook or misapprehend any
facts or law with regard to the issue of whether the purchase order
between Modulaire and Hercules for the procurement of the office
buildings

constituted

buildings.

a

contract

for

the

construction

of

the

The Court's decision on this issue was based upon two

rationales.
First, the stipulation regarding the contractual relationships
among Hercules, Modulaire, Space Building Systems and the Plaintiff
was enough to resolve the issue by itself.

Second, the Court looked

to the undisputed facts of the case and the language of the purchase
order to independently arrive at the conclusion that the purchase
order constituted a contract for the construction of the office
buildings.
Hercules complains of only the Court's usage of the stipulation
but says nothing about the facts cited by the Court or about the
necessary inferences drawn from those facts (as stated by the Court in
the second and third paragraphs of Footnote 4 on p. 7 of the Opinion).
1

Although the Court's ruling to reinstate the Plaintiff's
mechanic's lien foreclosure cause of action opens the door for
recover of attorneys' fees under Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-18,
such an award may only be recoverable from the amounts generated
from a foreclosure sale, if the mechanic's lien is ultimately
ordered to be foreclosed. At this juncture, the only sure method
for the Plaintiff to recover it attorneys' fees from Hercules is to
hold Hercules liable for such fees under Utah Code Annotated § 142-2 (1953 as amended in 1989). As the Court appropriately noted in
its opinion of August 31, 1990 at page 5, Hercules had its remedy
in its own hands (quoting language from Rio Grande Lumber Co. v.
Darke, 50 Utah 114, 122, 127, 167 P.2d 241, 244, 246 (1917). If
Hercules had done what the law requires and obtained a payment bond
from Modulaire, Hercules would have no liability under Utah Code
Annotated § 14-2-1 et seq. and the Plaintiff likely would have been
paid, including its attorneys' fees if it had to sue on the bond.
13

Hercules fails to state any facts which the Court overlooked or
misapprehended. Further, Hercules does not cite any statutory or case
authority which the Court overlooked or misapprehended.

Even if the

Court were to disregard the stipulation, the facts mandate the same
conclusion.
Hercules does attempt to mislead the Court into believing that
the Plaintiff must have privity of contract with Hercules for Utah
Code Annotated §§ 14-2-1 et seq. to apply.

Such is not the case.

While Hercules may have "always maintained that it is nothing more
than a lessee of the mobile trailers" (Petition for Rehearing at p.
7), that does not change the fact that the stipulation, the facts
presented at the trial and the language of the purchase order all
dictate that Hercules did in fact contract for the construction of the
office buildings. As the Court correctly stated, "Inherent in such a
lease is a contract for the construction of the building itself or
else the lease agreement would be void and of no effect." Opinion at
p. 7, Footnote 4.
Further, the award of attorneys fees is within the discretion of
the Court, albeit under Utah Code Annotated §14-2-2 (1953 as amended
in 1989) rather than under Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-3.

The

amendment to § 14-2-2 granting the Court power to award the prevailing
party a discretionary award of attorneys' fees is a procedural and
remedial

amendment which may be applied to accrued and pending

actions, even actions pending on appeal.
For

the

reasons

stated

herein, the

Plaintiff

respectfully

requests that the Court deny Hercules' Petition for Rehearing on all
issues except for a statement by the Court clarifying that the
Plaintiff is entitled to its reasonable attorneys' fees from Hercules
14

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-2 (1953 as amended in 1989)
rather than under Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-3 as stated in the
Opinion of August 31, 1990.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J£±_

day of October, 1990.

WALSTAD & BABCOCK

Darrel J. Bostwick
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

'^day of October, 1990, I caused

to be mailed, postage prepaid,

a true and correct copy of the

foregoing to the following:
James M. Elegante
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O, Box 11898

Salt Lake City, Utah

84147-0898
WALSTAD & BABCOCK

^TTSrrelT iXt/Bostwick

Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f
3-14-grabrply.rhr
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